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Abstract
We study the effects of the reform of the system of severance pay-
ments (TFR) of Italian employees on the cost and the access to credit
for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). The most direct conse-
quence of the reform is to reduce in the long run the amount of liquid
assets available to Italian firms. We argue that this reform, imple-
mented in July 2007, will reduce the aggregate investment by SMEs
in a more than proportional way, since it will restrict the access to
credit for some of them (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). However, we
also predict that the reform will not increase the cost of intermediated
finance, coeteris paribus. In order to assess the effects of the reform
on the investment of SMEs and on the cost of bank loans, we also
estimate the future outflows of TFR funds due to the reform.
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1 Introduction
Berger and Udell (1998) observe that small, private businesses are “acutely
informationally opaque” and argue that this is a major impediment for them
to access the public capital markets. Small firms are forced to rely mostly on
internal cash resources and on intermediated finance, because intermediaries
have some advantages on direct lending through the debt markets. They
can offer SMEs specific contracts that alleviate the acute adverse selection
problem (Bester (1985)) and they can monitor firms activity reducing moral
hazard (Diamond (1984)).
A recent reform of the system of severance indemnities in Italy is likely to
affect the amount of liquid assets of Italian SMEs, hence their main source
of internal finance. This law, included in the Financial Budget Law for 2007,
allows employees to choose from July 2007 on whether they want the future
flows of their severance indemnity fund (“Trattamento di Fine Rapporto”,
TFR) to be invested in pension funds, instead of being kept in the firm,
as it was previously done. Before the reform, a quota approximately equal
to one month pay was retained by the firm and paid to the worker at the
moment he/she would leave (voluntarily or not) his current employer1. From
the point of view of the firm, these funds were very similar to long-term
corporate debt, although with two major differences. The funds were being
backed by a State insurance scheme in case of insolvence of the firm, and by
receiving a remuneration determined by the Italian law2. Since the rate of
return paid on the TFR was lower than the risk-free rate of Treasury bond
in most of the years (at least before the introduction of the Euro), the TFR
flows traditionally provided cheap finance for Italian firms.
The reform of July 2007 allows workers to transfer their future TFR
flows in a pension fund3. Thus, Italian SMEs will lose (part) of this cheap
and liquid liability, in a proportion related to the amount of workers who
decide to invest their TFR outside the firm. The objective of this paper is
to determine the long-run effects of this reform on the access and the cost of
credit for small- and medium-sized firms.
1Every year, the employer must set aside in the TFR a quota equal to 1/13,5 (7.41an-
nual salary. Actually, only 6.91% is accumulated each year, as 0.5% is paid to National
Institute for Social Security Payments (INPS).
2The TFR is capitalized annually at a rate equal to 1.5% plus 34 of the inflation rate
measured in the previous year by the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT).
3More precisely, the law distinguishes between firms with less than 50 employees, and
those with 50 employees or more: for those working in the former who choose not to invest
their TFR in pension funds, it will remain within the firm; for those who work in larger
firms, the same choice will imply that the TFR indemnities are automatically deposited
within INPS.
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There is a quite large empirical evidence that the debt capacity of Ital-
ian SMEs is positively correlated with the dimension of the assets they can
pledge as collateral. Sapienza (1997) disentangles the determinants of the
demand and the supply of credit and concludes that loans supply is signif-
icantly correlated with assets tangibility. Guiso (2003) shows that size is a
major determinant of the probability of success in obtaining as much bank
finance as needed: firms with less than approximately 30 employees are twice
less likely to have financial debt than bigger firms, and this probability is
strongly and positively correlated with the quota of tangible assets over total
assets. From these observations, he concludes that “firms’ ability to pledge
collateral strengthens their capacity to borrow, in particular when bank-firm
relationships are not well established”.
These empirical findings justify the use of the model of credit rationing
proposed by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) (HT in the following) in order
to study the impact of the reform of severance payments on SMEs. Since
it is well documented that Italian SMEs have almost no access to public
debt, we use a modified version of HT assuming that the supply of capital
to firms is due only to financial intermediaries (in particular banks) who
typically perform an activity of costly monitoring firms’ decisions. We show
that in the long run the lower amount of liquid assets available to each firm
makes the credit constraints for the smaller firms more severe, reducing their
total investment; in turn, this decreases their demand of external finance,
and the interest rate. The main intuition of this result is that since debt
capacity is increasing in the amount of liquid assets invested by the firm
itself, reducing the latter also reduces the former, so that SMEs will be able
to make less investments on aggregate. As an extension of the HT framework,
we consider the case in which banks can optimally choose their monitoring
level, and we conclude that in this extended model version both the effects
produced in the long run on the investment level and the interest rate are
exacerbated. Our theoretical framework allows us to quantify the reduction
in investment SMEs will suffer as a function of the predicted outflow of
severance indemnity. Our main theoretical prediction is that in the long run
the flow of new investments will decrease by more than proportionally to
the TFR outflow. For our empirical analysis we have collected data from
the Bank of Italy about the total credit granted to Italian firms, divided by
class of the total amount of credit each client has received. Assuming that
most of the SMEs receive a total annual credit which is less than 125,000
euros, we obtain an upper bound of their total bank borrowing. From ISTAT
data showing the distribution of private sector employees and earnings across
firms’ size (defined by the number of employees) we recover the annual flow of
TFR in 2007. Based on assumptions on the macroeconomic development of
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employment and wages, we then project TFR flows for the period 2008-2010
and assess the magnitude of TFR funds that Italian firms would lose as a
result of the reform.
Finally, we use data from Guiso (2003) to obtain the average leverage
of SMEs towards financial institutions. Our simulations predict that the
decrease of SMEs investment due to the reform will be equal to 130-147% of
the outflow of TFR in the long run. Our theoretical model also forecasts that
in equilibrium the loan rate will not increase in the long run; empirically, we
forecast it may slightly decrease - coeteris paribus - for an amount inversely
proportional to the elasticity of the supply of bank capital.
Our results suggest that in order to reduce the negative impact of the
reform on SMEs investment, the Italian government should not subsidize the
cost of future bank loans to firms (as it is doing now), but instead should
protect the access to credit of firms who are loosing a quota of their liquid
funds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
basic theoretical framework for the analysis, which is a simplified version of
HT (1997), while section 3 discusses the effects of the policy change predicted
by the model. Section 4 presents the data and our estimates for the future
outflows of TFR, together with a quantitative assessment of the main effects
of the reform on the future investment and the loan rate. Section 5 concludes.
2 The basic model
Our theoretical framework for the analysis of the effects of the reform of
the Italian severance payment system is a simplified version of the model
in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In our version of the model there are two
sets of agents: (small) firms and financial intermediaries. They operate on
two periods: in the first period a financial contract between each single firm
and a competitive intermediary (a bank in the following) is signed, and firms
invest; in the second period the returns of investment are realized and are
distributed. Each firm has an initial amount of capital A0, representing the
market value of all assets that can be pledged as a collateral to the financial
contract (a loan in the following). The distribution of assets across firms is
described by the c.d.f. F (A), and the aggregate amount of firm capital is
denoted by Kf =
∫
AdF (A). All banks are identical in any relevant respect
for the analysis.
Each firm is endowed with the same investment projects: a good project
G and a bad project W . The firm can undertake any of them paying an
initial amount I > A0, which represents the scale of the project. The firm
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with own internal capital A0 needs then to borrow (at least) I − A0 from
the bank in order to undertake the investment at level I. Investing I in the
good project generates at t = 2 a verifiable return, equal either to 0 (with
probability 1− pH) or to R(I) (with probability pH), while the investment I
in the bad project pays 0 with probability 1− pL and R(I) with probability
pL, with pL < pH .
In each firm a risk-neutral entrepreneur selects his preferred project.
Moral hazard between the entrepreneur and the investor is formalized as
in HT: for any unit of investment in the bad project, the entrepreneur en-
joys private benefits B. The choice of the good project by the entrepreneur
reduces his private benefits to zero.
Following Holmstrom and Tirole, the gross rate of return on bank loans is
denoted by β. On the public capital markets the risk-free rate is normalized
to zero. As in HT, we assume that β ≥ 1 in order to make economically
profitable for banks to invest in the SMEs’ projects. All individuals are risk-
neutral, and due to portfolio optimization, the aggregate supply of credit to
SMEs is (weakly) increasing with β: the higher β, the more restricted is the
set of alternative projects in the economy which provide at least the same
expected return as the ones undertaken by SMEs. Thus, the higher β, the
more capital banks will be willing to invest in SMEs’ projects.
Only the good project dominates the investment in public capital markets
while the bad project has a negative NPV:
pHR(I)− I > 0 > pLR(I) +BI − I (1)
Given (1), a necessary condition for the firm getting external finance is
the entrepreneur chooses the good project:
pHR
f (I) ≥ pLR
f (I) +BI (2)
where Rf (I)4 is the share of the project returns paid to the firm. Under (2)
each SME chooses the amount of internal assets A ≤ A0 to invest, knowing
that the expected return for the bank is bounded by the quota of the proceeds
that is paid to the firm Rf , in order to let the entrepreneur choose project
G. Finally, we assume that the total return of the project in case of success
is linear in the initial investment, R(I) = RI. Under these assumptions,
it is obvious that the firm will invest all its internal funds in the project,
A = A0, but it will never borrow more than it needs to implement a given
investment level I. Indeed, the internal rate of return of an investment in
4From now on, for easiness of notation, we will drop the functional form Rf (I) to just
Rf .
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the good project for a firm is higher than β5 and, for any fixed I, the firm
pays a gross return of β ≥ 1 on external funds (while the opportunity cost
of internal funds is equal to 1).
The decision problem of the risk-neutral entrepreneur is then simpl given
as:
max
I
pHR
f
s.t. pH
(
RI −Rf
)
= β(I − A0) (3)
pHR
f ≥ pLR
f +BI (4)
where the first constraint ensures that the bank earns a gross return of β on
its investment I−A0 and the second constraint ensures that the entrepreneur
chooses the good project (incentive constraint).
Substituting for (3) we can rewrite the incentive constraint (4) as
A0 ≥ I
(
1−
pH
β
(
R−
B
∆p
))
.We assume that the expression within brackets is positive which is equivalent
to specify that the NPV of the good project at a cost of capital of β is positive.
We can then rewrite the problem as
max
I
pHRI − β(I −A0)
s.t. I ≤
A0
1− pH
β
(
R− B
∆p
)
Since we have assumed that the internal rate of return of a good project
is higher than β, firms invest the highest possible I given the initial liquid
assets equal to A0:
I =
A0
1− pH
β
(
R− B
∆p
) (5)
A form of "investment multiplier" of internal cash is at work here: each
unit invested by the firm allows to attract more than one unit of external
5Investing in a good project, a firm earns
pHR
f = pHRI − β(I −A) = (pHR− β) I + βA
= (pHR− β) I + βA0
which is higher than what the firm would get investing all her liquid assets A0 at rate β.
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capital to invest in the good project. Indeed, A0 increases the total invest-
ment I by 1/
[
1− pH
β
(
R − B
∆p
)]
> 1. The final payoff is split between Rf ,
which goes to the firm, and Rb, paid to the bank, in such a way that it is
possible to remunerate the bank capital exactly at the gross discount rate β,
and to let the firm earn a higher rate on its initial investment A0.
To find the equilibrium on the market for intermediated capital, we solve
for the rate β∗ that equalizes demand and supply of bank capital. The
aggregate demand of credit is given by
D(β) =
∫
(I − A0) dF (A0) =

 1
1− pH
β
(
R− B
∆p
) − 1

∫ A0dF (A0) (6)
while the supply of bank capital is exogenously given and equal to Kb(β),
where K ′b = ∂Kb(β)/∂β > 0. The aggregate demand of intermediated capital
is monotone decreasing in β6.
Let Kf =
∫
A0dF (A0) be the aggregate internal funds of firms. The
equilibrium on the (intermediated) capital market is:
 1
1− pH
β
(
R − B
∆p
) − 1

Kf = Kb(β)
E(Rb) (Kf +Kb(β)) = βK
b(β) (7)
where we denote for simplicity pH (R−B/∆p) = E(R
b)
The market clearing is obtained varying the return β (hence the aggregate
supply of capital Kb(β) as well), while Kf is fixed. One can interpret the
equilibrium condition as follows: if β is "too" high, the supply of capital
banks are willing to invest in SMEs is higher than the demand; reducing
β increases the maximum investment I a firm with initial liquid assets A0
can sustain, by (5),; thus in turn increases the demand D(β), and reduces
the supply Kb(β) until the equilibrium is reached. Notice finally that the
aggregate level of investment, Kf + Kb(β), depends only on the aggregate
level of firm capital Kf , since Kb(β) adjusts to guarantee the equilibrium on
the market.
6Denoting pH
(
R− B∆p
)
= E(Rb) we have:
∂

 Kf
1−
E(Rb)
β
E(Rb)
β


∂β
=
E(Rb)Kf
E(Rb)−β
1
β−E(Rb)
< 0.
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3 The effects of the reform: the model pre-
dictions
The reform approved by the Italian Parliament allows each employee in the
private sector to invest his future flows of severance indemnities (TFR), which
the firm was managing up to 2007 as its own liabilities, in pension fund
schemes. Thus, if we assume that the status quo is stationary in the sense
that the inflows of severance payments in every period is equal to the outflows,
the reform is going to reduce the inflow without affecting the outflow of TFR.
Each firm will then suffer a reduction in the amount of liquid assets. In terms
of the model presented above, the most direct consequence of this reform is a
decline of A0 (with respect to the case of no reform) from July 2007 on. The
key question of interest is then how such a decrease in all firms’ internal funds
affects the equilibrium cost of capital, demand of credit and investment.
From (5) it is clear that a reduction of one unit in A0 decreases I by more
than one unit. As a consequence, less bank capital can be attracted due
to the binding participation constraint of the bank: Ib = pH
(
R− B
∆p
)
I/β.
This in turn reduces the aggregate demand of intermediated capital. We
can show that as a consequence of this "multiplier" effect, the reduction
of aggregate investment at equilibrium is higher than the reduction of the
aggregate amount of liquid assets Kf .
Proposition 1 If all firms’ internal liquid funds A0 marginally decrease,
causing a decrease of the aggregate internal funds Kf , then the cost of bank
capital for the firms will decrease as well as the aggregate investment in the
firms (good) projects. Moreover, the latter will reduce more than proportion-
ally than Kf :
dβ
dKf
=
E(Rb)
K∗b + (β
∗ −E(Rb))K ′b(β
∗)
≥ 0 (8)
dI
dKf
> 1 (9)
Proof: A decrease in each firm A0 is going to reduce the firm investment,
see (5). However, the aggregate reduction in Kf will also have an effect on
the equilibrium cost of capital β, by (7)7. Let us rewrite equation (5) as:
I = (1 + φ(β))A0 (10)
7The comparative statics result described in HT for
∂(Kb+Kf )
∂Kf
holds only if one considers
∂β∗
∂Kf
= 0.
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where φ(β) =
ERb/β
1− ERb/β
> 0 iff β > ERb. Aggregating (10) across firms
one obtains
Kb +Kf = (1 + φ(β))Kf
Kb = φ(β)Kf
Differentiating the equilibrium condition (7) w.r.to Kf we obtain:
dβ
dKf
Kb (β(Kf)) + β
dKb
dKf
= ERb
(
1 +
dKb
dKf
)
∂β
∂Kf
Kb (β) + β
(
∂Kb
∂β
∂β
∂Kf
)
= ERb
(
1 +
∂Kb
∂β
∂β
∂Kf
)
∂β
∂Kf
(
Kb +
∂Kb
∂β
(
β − ERb
))
= ERb
∂β
∂Kf
=
ERb
Kb +K ′b (β − ER
b)
≥ 0
We now move to compute explicitly the change in aggregate investment,
1 + dKb
dKf
due to the variation dKf . From Kb = φ(β(Kf))Kf one obtains:
dKb
dKf
=
∂Kb
∂β
∂β
∂Kf
+
∂Kb
∂Kf
= Kfφ
′(β)
∂β
∂Kf
+ φ(β)
where φ′(β) = −
ERb
(β − ERb)2
< 0. Substituting for φ′(β) and φ(β) into the
previous expression leads to:
dKb
dKf
= Kf
∂β
∂Kf
(
−
ERb
(β −ERb)2
)
+
ERb/β
1− ERb/β
thus :
dKf + dKb
dKf
= Kf
(
1−
∂β
∂Kf
ERb
(β −ERb)2
)
+
ERb/β
1− ERb/β
=
ERb
β −ERb
−
ERb
(β − ERb)2
Kf
∂β
∂Kf
+Kf
= φ(β)− φ(β)Kf
1
β − ERb
∂β
∂Kf
+Kf
and substituting for ∂β
∂Kf
results in:
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dKf + dKb
dKf
= φ(β)
(
1−Kf
1
β − ERb
ERb
Kb +K ′b(β −ER
b)
)
+Kf
= φ(β)
(
1−
ERb
β −ERb
Kf
Kb +K ′b(β − ER
b)
)
+Kf
= φ(β)
(
1− φ(β)
Kf
Kb +K ′b(β −ER
b)
)
+Kf
= φ(β)
(
1− φ(β)
(
Kf
Kb
− δ
))
+Kf
= φ(β)
(
1− φ(β)
Kf
Kb
+ δφ(β)
)
+Kf
= δφ2(β) +Kf > Kf
where δ =
Kf
Kb
−
Kf
Kb+K
′
b
(β−ERb)
> 0. 
We can make three important observations. First, the proof of the propo-
sition shows our main difference with the theoretical findings in HT. Their
comparative statics result for
∂(Kb+Kf )
∂Kf
holds only if one considers ∂β
∗
∂Kf
= 0.
In proposition 1 we explicitely consider this indirect effect on the equilibrium
loan rate.
Secondly, notice that at a firm level the same result as proposition 1 holds
for the firm investment only if all firms suffer the same proportional loss in
A0. In our setup, however, it is not crucial whether the reduction in A0
is different across firms, since every firm has the same production function.
Thus, for the aggregate level of investment what matters is only the total
amount of TFR funds that is transferred from the firms8.
Finally, to estimate relations (8)-(9), we will use the fact that in the
model E(Rb)/β∗ = Ib/I, while the elasticity of the supply of capital to
SMEs K ′b/(K
∗
b /β
∗) must be calibrated on real data.
We now check whether the role of banks as firms monitors (Diamond
(1984)) may alter the predictions obtained before. For simplicity we consider
monitoring as essential for receiving bank finance (because SMEs do not have
access to uninformed finance in our model), but in their role of delegated
monitors, banks also suffer of a moral hazard problem towards the depositors
(Diamond (1984); Chiesa (2001)). Thus, in our model, contrarily to HT, the
choice of monitoring by the bank is endogenous.
8When the technology is the same for all firms affected by the reform and it has constant
returns to scale, it is not important which firm actually loses most due to the exit of TFR
funds and which one is affected less. They all have, in a way, the "same" production
function.
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We restrict our analysis to an exclusive bank-firm relationship9. We first
show that the monitoring intensity of banks increases with the ratio of own
capital to the total invested capital (as in Chiesa (2001), Carletti (2004),
Carletti et al. (2005), among others). To illustrate this point, let us write
the profit function of a representative bank as:
Πbank = E
[
max{R˜bI − rDD; 0}
]
−
cI
2
m2 (11)
where
R˜b =
{
R − B
∆p
with proba. pH(m)
0 with proba. 1− pH(m)
given that, to provide the entrepreneur with the right incentives, the max-
imum payoff obtained by the bank is R − (B/∆p) for each unit invested.
The probability of success of the good project is increasing in the level of
monitoring effort by the bank. We denote with rD the rate of return paid on
deposits, and with D the amount of deposits raised by the bank. The cost of
monitoring activity is linear in the dimension of the project (the investment
I) and convex in the monitoring intensity m10.
The rationale of this formalization is that by performing a high moni-
toring activity the bank can improve the expected cash flow of the project
(increasing the probability of success).
Rewriting (11) gives
Πbank = pH(m)
(
RbI − (rD − S)D
)
−
cI
2
m2
= pH(m)
(
Rb(A0 + E +D)− (rD − S)D
)
−
cI
2
m2
where S = (1 − pH(m))rD represents the per -unit expected shortfall on
the deposit contract, E is the bank own equity capital, and c is the unit
monitoring cost for the bank. Solving for the optimal monitoring intensity
9We assume here that SMEs will not change the number of bank relationships following
the reform. Hellwig (1991), Rajan (1992) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that a
unique bank relationship helps the access to credit, but it can be more expensive in the
long run (a "hold up" problem). However, Detragiache et al. (1997) find that Italian firms
typically maintain multiple relations with banks. In principle, we cannot exclude then
that, if the firms access to credit will decrease in the future, some of the smallest firms
will react by restricting themselves to a unique relation with a bank.
10We choose such a formalization for the costs of monitoring since without moral hazard
between bank and depositors the optimal monitoring intensity would be independent of I.
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gives:
max
m
Πbank (12)
m∗ =
∆p
c
(
Rb − rD
D
I
)
(13)
which is decreasing in D/I because of the moral hazard towards depositors.
Since the deposit rate is set before monitoring is decided, the bank always
has an incentive to increase her profit by increasing the expected shortfall,
thus reducing monitoring ex-post. The higher the ratio of external capital,
D/I, the lower the incentive to provide monitoring.
The next step verifies that proposition 1 holds also in this new setup.
Turning to the equilibrium condition (7), the lower monitoring activity af-
fects the term E(Rb(m)) that is now equal to pH(m)R
b− (c/2)m2. This term
is increasing in m since by f.o.c. of (12), ∆Rb − cm∗ = − ∂S
∂m
D > 0. Thus a
reduction onm, caused by the lower A0, reduces in turn E(R
b(m)) causing an
even stronger decrease in Kb(β) at equilibrium
11. The effect on aggregate in-
vestment described in proposition 1 is then exacerbated when we allow banks
to monitor the firms activity, choosing their optimal monitoring intensity.
4 An estimate of the capital outflows due to
the reform
In order to make predictions about the change of the aggregate credit granted
by banks and about the loan rate obtained by SMEs, we have to quantita-
tively determine two elements exogenous to our theoretical analysis. First,
11More formally, we can re-write the aggregated equilibrium condition as:
βKb(β) = E(Rb(m))(Kf +Kb)
and differentiate by dKf . We obtain
dβ
dKf
(
Kb(β) +K
′
b(β)
(
β −E(Rb(m))
))
= E(Rb(m)) +
∂E(Rb(m))
∂m
∂m
∂Kf
(Kf +Kb)
dβ
dKf
=
E(Rb(m)) + ∂E(R
b(m))
∂m
∂m
∂Kf
(Kf +Kb)
Kb(β) +K′b(β) (β −E(R
b(m)))
>
E(Rb(m))
Kb(β) +K′b(β) (β −E(R
b(m)))
for any given level ofm, since monitor intensitym increases when total investmentKf+Kb
is higher (due to the fact that the ratio D/I reduces for higher I) and since ∂E(R
b(m))
∂m
> 0.
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we have to predict the outflow of funds from SMEs due to the reform. Sec-
ond, we need to assess the reaction of the bank credit to SMEs following a
collateral squeeze. Here we concentrate on the first aspect.
The TFR consists in a fraction of gross earnings set aside by the employ-
ers12 and paid back to workers when their working relationship ends (for any
reason, including retirement). The amount set aside every year sums up to
the already existing stock which is capitalized at a given rate13.
The severance pay reform, firstly announced and approved in 2004 but
modified afterwards within the Budget Law of 2007, does not concern the
TFR stock already accumulated within the firms, but only its future flows.
More precisely, from July 2007 on workers have to decide whether to invest
their current and future TFR flows in private pension funds or not. If they do
not make an explicit choice, their TFR flows will be automatically diverted
into pre-specified pension funds, according to a mechanism where no choice
is equivalent to a tacit consent. In case they explicitly state that they do
not want to join any pension fund, their TFR will either be accumulated to
INPS (if they work in firms with 50+ employees14), or it will remain at the
firm’s disposal (for firms with less than 50 employees).
Even though the reform has been implemented in July 2007, data about
its effects are still scarce. The reform caused TFR flows amounting to 3.2
billion euro to be invested in pension funds during 2007, which is 1.5 billion
more than in 2006 (Covip, 2008a). About 30% of private sector employees
were members of a pension fund in 2007, compared to about 25 % in 2006
(Covip, 2008b).
A broader view on the reform is provided by an ad hoc survey carried out by
Eurisko for Anima Research Lab on more than 1,000 private sector employees
who were asked how they allocated their TFR flows (the data are described
in greater detail in Boeri and Zingales, 2008). Table 1 reports some summary
statistics about workers’ choices as of July 1st 2007, and allows to infer the
actual destination of TFR flows.
12The aggregate flows accruing each year are calculated as
FlowTFRi,t = 6, 91% ∗Wtfr(i,t)
where Wtfr(i,t) is the aggregate gross wage received by employees.
13The TFR stock at the end of each year is equal to:
TFRi,t = (1 + rt)(TFRi,t−1 − TFRLIQi,t) + FlowTFRi,t
where TFRLIQi,t is the amount of TFR liquidated in year t due to the exit of the employee
from the firm, and rt is the rate at which TFR is capitalized annually, that is 1.5% plus
3/4 of the inflation rate annually measured by ISTAT.
14That is medium and large firms according to the European classification (EC, 2003).
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Table 1: Workers’ choice and TFR destination, by firm size (percentages)
“Raw” private employees’ choices
<50 50+ Total
Pension Fund 10.09 41.48 22.65
Firm 77.50 47.67 65.57
Did not choose 12.4 10.85 11.78
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
TFR destinations
<50 50+ Total
Pension Fund 22.49 52.33 34.43
Firm 77.50 0.00 46.51
INPS 0.00 47.67 19.06
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own elaboration on FRBD, 2008.
Note: percentages in the bottom panel are computed recalling that
not choosing is equivalent to putting the TFR into pension funds,
and that in firms with 50+ employees TFR flows not going to pen-
sion funds are diverted to INPS. All data weighted using FRDB
(2008) weights.
Table 1 shows workers’ choices about their TFR (first panel) and how
these choices translated in terms of TFR allocation (second panel). The
most preferred choice — both in small and medium-large firms — is to leave
the funds at the employer’s disposal. Analogously, the percentage of workers
who do not choose any specific investment for their TFR is quite similar
across firm size. However, a remarkable difference between the two groups
is given by those who actively decided: only 10% out of small firms’ workers
decided to join a pension fund, while this percentage increases to 41.5 in
larger firms. Using other answers from the same survey, Boeri and Zingales
(2008) suggest that workers trust more their own firm than INPS, so when
faced with the choice between pension funds and INPS they tend to choose
the former more often than when they have to decide between pension funds
and firm15.
15This happens even though TFR flows into INPS are going to receive exactly the
same treatment as within the firm in terms of capitalization and workers are not going to
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The idea that workers in firms with 50+ employees chose pension funds
more often than workers in smaller ones is confirmed by Covip data on the
participation to occupational funds: the membership rate of private sector
employees is 12% in firms with less than 50 workers and 42% in medium-large
ones (Covip, 2008a).
In order to get an insight on the outflows of TFR from Italian SMEs,
we first focus on the forecasts of the total yearly TFR, which represent the
(maximum) total amount of money that can be diverted from firms due to
the reform16. Table 2 shows TFR flows in 2007, by firm size. Various Istat
sources have been employed to assess the magnitude of 2007 TFR17. As Table
2 shows, small firms make up for more than half private sector employees.
However, since earnings are on average higher in larger firms most TFR is
accumulated in firms with more than 50 employees.
Table 2: Macro data on earnings and TFR, 2007
Private sector Avg gross earnings Wage bill Total TFR
employees per employee
(number) (Th euro) (Th euro) (Th euro)
< 50 6,014,429 18.737 112,691,294 7,786,968
50+ 5,662,249 26.950 152,597,242 10,544,469
Total 11,676,678 22.528 265,288,537 18,331,438
Source: Istat, various years
experience any practical difference.
16In doing this, we assume that the reform is not affecting the labor market conditions,
i.e. is not going to provoke a change in the structure of employment (between SMEs
and large firms) nor is going to affect the duration of employment. Also, we do not try
to estimate the outflows of TFR due to workers changing employer or leaving the labor
market, which in reality affect the availability of funds for each firm (Fugazza and Teppa,
2005). Our approach to the labor market conditions is admittedly strong, since it reduces
to an estimate of future inflows to the TFR based only on the total employment level and
the average remuneration.
17The number of private sector employees up to 2006, by firm size, is from ISTAT (2008).
The 2007 figure has been obtained applying the growth rate of dependent employees as
from ISTAT, (2008). The average gross earnings per dependent employee, by firm size, up
to 2005 comes from ISTAT (2007). Growth rates up to 2007 are from ISTAT (2008). The
wage bill has been obtained by multiplying the number of dependent employees by their
average salary. Total TFR corresponds to 6.91% of the wage bill.
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The amount of TFR amount shown in Table 2 is then used to compute
TFR destinations in 2007, applying the participation rates to the reform re-
ported in Table 1, and assuming that all choices concerning TFR destination
were taken as of July 1st 2007. We compute the total amount of TFR flows
that were respectively invested into pension funds, collected by INPS, or re-
mained within the firms in 2007. The results of Table 3 include how much
TFR has been “lost” by firms, that is the sum of TFR paid to INPS and to
pension funds18.
A few remarks are needed regarding the results of Table 3. First, the flow
to pension funds and INPS in 2007 is relatively small because the reform
does not apply to the whole year. Therefore, firms will “lose” relatively more
funds in the future. Second, most TFR is lost by medium-large firms both
because they accumulate most TFR and because they lose this source of fi-
nancing entirely (either to INPS or to pension funds). On the contrary SMEs
(<50) lose a smaller amount (i.e. only the flows diverted to pension funds).
Although results in Table 3 are obtained under admittedly strong assump-
tions, they are closely in line with aggregate data from other sources. First,
Covip (2008a) reports that the amount of TFR flows conveyed in pension
funds in 2007 was equal to 3.2 billion euro. The fact the we obtain a slightly
higher value might be because some workers are allowed to invest in pension
funds only a fraction of their TFR. Second, according to ISTAT (2008) the
total amount of TFR lost by firms in 2007 amounted to 6.8 billion euro and
the TFR flows going into firms19 were about 13.9 billion in the same year.
Both figures are not too distant from what we find (respectively 6.1 and 12.2
billion euro).
Table 4 shows projections of TFR flows that firms are going to “lose” in
the future, according to various hypotheses about macroeconomic scenarios
and the participation to the reform. We chose three growth rates for the total
TFR (2.5%, 3.5%, 4.5%) reflecting employment and wages growth20 and two
alternative scenarios for workers’ participation in pension funds. In the first
we assumed workers are going to choose their future TFR destination with
the same frequencies as of July 2007. In the second, we assume an increasing
participation to private pension funds (50% of TFR in pension funds by
2010).
18We assume that workers’ choices about TFR destination — as displayed in the second
panel of Table 1 — only apply to TFR flows in the second semester.
19We have adjusted the figures in order to make them comparable with those of Table
2, by subtracting agricultural/fishery in accordance with the definition used in ISTAT,
(2008).
20Overall TFR grew at an average rate of 3.6% in the 2000-2006 period (ISTAT, 2008)
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Table 3: TFR destination, by firm size (Th euro)
<50 50+ Total
Second semester 2007
Pension funds 875,645 2,758,960 3,634,605
Firm 3,017,450 - 3,017,450
INPS - 2,513,274 2,513,274
Total 3,893,484 5,272,235 9,165,719
Total 2007
Pension funds 875,645 2,758,960 3,634,605
Firm 6,910,934 5,272,235 12,183,169
INPS - 2,513,274 2,513,274
Total 7,786,968 10,544,469 18,331,438
Total TFR “lost” by firms 875,645 5,272,235 6,147,879
Source: own elaboration on Istat (various years) and FRDB (2008).
Note: To compute data in this table we use TFR amounts from the last
column of Table 2 — halved to reflect our assumption that choices are
made as of July 1st 2007 — and apply to them the percentages indicated
in the second panel of Table 1, indicating TFR destinations. TFR “lost”
by firms equals the sum of TFR paid to pension funds and INPS.
As we can see, TFR lost from 2008 on roughly doubles with respect to 2007
and — as already noted — every year medium-large firms lose a remarkably
higher amount than small ones (which lose up to 4.4 billion euro in 2010)
with respect to the case of no reform. Moreover, the amount of TFR lost
by firms is obviously increasing with higher TFR growth rates and in the
scenario where workers’ participation to pension funds increases.
In the following, we derive some first indications on the potential impact
of TFR outflows on the loan rate paid by firms.
The main theoretical predictions of the model are contained in equations
(8) and (9). Thus, we will calibrate the main parameters of the model on
real data.
The bank’s participation constraint reads as: Ib = E(Rb)I/β, that is
E(Rb) = βIb/I. We measure Ib/I with the ratio between financial debt over
total capital observed on the capital structure of firms. The reason for our
choice is the following: if we assume that the optimal capital structure is
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quite stable across time, the leverage ratio we observe should correspond to
the optimal ratio between the flow of external finance and the total capital
flow. Guiso (2003) measures this ratio for Italian manufacturing firms from
a survey of over 4,000 firms (mostly small and medium-sized) conducted in
1999 by Mediocredito Centrale, obtaining a median value of 23.1% and an
average value of 32.2%. We use these two statistics as an estimate of Ib/I.
Furthermore, we obtain a measure of the total bank credit to firms from
the “Bollettino Statistico” of the Bank of Italy: in this report, we can ob-
serve the total credit granted from banks (and other financial institutions)
to all clients, classified by loan size. We obtain from this document, for each
class, both the number of credits and the total amount lent by all banks and
financial institutions in Italy. We use this information to estimate the total
capital K∗b banks lend to firms at equilibrium before the reform. Reason-
ably, small firms obtain on average credits of relatively small amounts, hence
we refer to the credit classes with less than 250,000 euros. Since SMEs are
probably not the only clients obtaining such a loan (households mortgages
for investments in real estate represent for sure an important quota of these
loans), we consider the numbers reported by Bank of Italy as an upper bound
of the credits granted to SMEs.
To compute the impact of the reform on the loan rate paid by SMEs who
still have access to bank credit pre- and post-reform, we need the equilibrium
loan rate pre-reform, and the elasticity of the banks supply of capital to the
loan rate. We obtain information about the average loan rate currently paid
by SMEs from the survey by Capitalia (2005), indicating an average rate of
7.4% for the period 2001-2003 across all size classes. We use the lower and
the upper bounds (5.4% and 8.2%) in this same survey as two limit scenarios.
Finally, to estimate the elasticity of the loan supply with respect to the
loan rate we rely on Huelsewig, Mayer and Wollmershaeuser (2005) who use
aggregate data to estimate the response of bank loans to a monetary policy
shock. As a robustness check, we also use the estimates in King (1986), and
we notice that the sensitivity of the change in the loan rate to this elasticity
parameter is extremely low. Finally, the impact of the reform on the future
investment is independent of this parameter (see equation (9)). Our main
conclusions are collected in Table 5.
Table 5 indicates that the impact of the outflow of TFR from the balance
sheet of SMEs on the loan rate is, in any of the scenarios, negligible (a
maximum reduction of far less than one basis point in any possible scenario).
Indeed, the model forecasts that the reduced amount of assets forces some
firms to lose their access to credit, reducing the aggregate demand of loans
that banks can accept. The impact on the loan rate is proportional to the
outflow of TFR, but in any case we see that this amount is too low to produce
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any important macroeconomic effect on β.
However, according to (9) and (5), the reform will produce an important
reduction of SMEs investment. In particular, the forecasted reduction is
more than proportional to the outflow of the TFR, and it is larger the larger
the quota of investment actually financed by the banks (i.e. the higher the
leverage ratio of SMEs, according to our assumptions). We assess that this
reduction can be about 130%-147% of the future outflow of TFR, as an effect
of the “multiplier" 1/
(
1− Ib/I
)
. To obtain this result we proxy Ib/I with
the amount of bank financing on total firms assets estimated by Guiso (2003)
for Italian SMEs. The lower and the upper bounds of our interval correspond
respectively to Guiso’s highest and lowest estimates of the ratio between bank
financement and total firm assets.
We conclude then that if the reform will have a negative impact on the
SMEs, this will be due to their reduced access to bank credit, and not to
more expensive loans for those firms who will continue to access bank credit.
Some of the SMEs will be forced to ask more financing, and due to the risk
of moral hazard, banks will reject their requests; this in turn will decrease
aggregate investment. A useful policy intervention would then subsidize the
access to credit for firms. Just subsidizing loans that are in any case already
granted by banks to some of the SMEs, as the government decided to do in
the 2007 law, is not going to reduce the inefficiency.
5 Conclusions
The lack of external capital is often quoted as one of the main impediments
for SMEs to grow. In the presence of a moral hazard problem between the
borrowing firm and external financiers, the debt capacity of the former de-
pends on the amount of collateral SMEs can pledge to the lender (Berger
and Udell (1995), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)), and the amount of liquid
assets they invest in the new projects. In our paper, we study the effects of
the 2007 government reform of the system of severance indemnities currently
in use for Italian employees on the cost and the access to credit for Italian
SMEs. The most direct consequence of the reform is to reduce the amount
of liquid assets of Italian firms, with respect to the situation pre-reform.
Some empirical literature (Guiso (2003), Bianco (1997), Sapienza (1997))
provides evidence that Italian firms are credit constrained if they operate
below a certain assets threshold, suggesting that the liquid net worth is one
of the main determinants for their debt capacity. The Italian severance pay-
ments reform produces then a structural break on the dynamics of SMEs
liquid assets which fully satisfies the assumptions of the debt capacity theory
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mentioned above. We use the model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to make
predictions about the effects of such a reform on the aggregate investments
of SMEs, their access to credit, and the loan rate.
In order to gain insight on the reform effects, we performed an estimate of the
future outflows from the severance indemnities fund. As the reform reaches
its steady-state from 2008 on, the overall annual outflow amounts to over 10
billion euro. However, most of the outflow affects medium-large firms, while
SMEs suffer a relatively smaller loss.
Using the annual outflows computed under different scenarios, we then pro-
vided some estimates of the effects on the loan rate and investments according
to our theoretical model. First, the impact of the outflow of TFR from the
balance sheet of SMEs on the cost of intermediated finance is likely to be, in
any of the scenarios, negligible. Indeed, the model forecasts that the reduced
amount of assets forces some firms to lose their access to credit, reducing
the aggregate demand of loans that banks can accept, but this amount is
too low to produce any important macroeconomic effect on β. Second, we
showed that the proposed reform will reduce in the long run the aggregate
investment by SMEs at a rate that is more than proportional to the outflows
of TFR funds: this reduction is higher the higher the current leverage ratio
of firms.
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Table 4: TFR projection 2007-2010, by destination (billion euro)
Same choices as in 2007 Increasing participation to PF
TFR growth: 2.5% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010
Pension funds 3.6 7.5 7.6 7.8 3.6 9.0 10.8 12.7
Firm 12.2 6.2 6.3 6.5 12.2 5.5 4.8 4.2
INPS 2.5 5.2 5.3 5.4 2.5 4.3 3.6 2.8
Total 18.3 18.8 19.3 19.7 18.3 18.8 19.3 19.7
Lost by firms, of which 6.1 12.6 12.9 13.2 6.1 13.3 14.4 15.5
<50 0.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 0.9 2.5 3.3 4.2
50+ 5.3 10.8 11.1 11.4 5.3 10.8 11.1 11.4
TFR growth: 3.5% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010
Pension funds 3.6 7.5 7.8 8.1 3.6 9.1 11.0 13.1
Firm 12.2 6.2 6.5 6.7 12.2 5.5 4.9 4.3
INPS 2.5 5.2 5.4 5.6 2.5 4.4 3.7 2.9
Total 18.3 19.0 19.6 20.3 18.3 19.0 19.6 20.3
Lost by firms, of which 6.1 12.7 13.2 13.6 6.1 13.5 14.7 16.0
<50 0.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 0.9 2.6 3.4 4.3
50+ 5.3 10.9 11.3 11.7 5.3 10.9 11.3 11.7
TFR growth: 4.5% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010
Pension funds 3.6 7.6 7.9 8.3 3.6 9.2 11.2 13.5
Firm 12.2 6.3 6.6 6.9 12.2 5.6 5.0 4.4
INPS 2.5 5.3 5.5 5.7 2.5 4.4 3.7 3.0
Total 18.3 19.2 20.0 20.9 18.3 19.2 20.0 20.9
Lost by firms, of which 6.1 12.8 13.4 14.0 6.1 13.6 15.0 16.5
<50 0.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 0.9 2.6 3.5 4.4
50+ 5.3 11.0 11.5 12.0 5.3 11.0 11.5 12.0
Note: 2007 amounts are taken from Table 3 and are then projected according to a TFR
growth hypothesis (2.5%, 3.5%, 4.5%) and a participation hypothesis. In the scenario
“Same choices as in 2007” we assumed workers will choose their TFR destination with the
same frequencies as in 2007. In the scenario “Increasing participation to PF”, we assume
that 50% of TFR will be paid to pension funds by 2010.23
Table 5: Decrease in the loan rate (percentage points) due to the reform
Bank Interest Loans supply “Same as 2007” “Increased particip.”
financinga rateb elasticityc 3.5% 4.5% 3.5% 4.5%
23.1 5.4 0.14 0.000090 0.000091 0.000127 0.000128
0.65 0.000066 0.000067 0.000093 0.000094
8.2 0.14 0.000137 0.000138 0.000192 0.000194
0.65 0.000101 0.000102 0.000142 0.000143
32.2 5.4 0.14 0.000127 0.000128 0.000178 0.000180
0.65 0.000096 0.000097 0.000136 0.000137
8.2 0.14 0.000193 0.000194 0.000271 0.000274
0.65 0.000146 0.000148 0.000206 0.000208
Sources:
a Guiso (2003)
b Lower and upper bounds from Capitalia (2003)
c Huelsewig, Mayer and Wollmershaeuser (2005); King (1986)
Note: by rearranging equation (8) we obtain dβ
dKf
=
β I
b
I
K∗
b
(
1+
K′
b
K∗
b
β(1− I
b
I
)
) where Ib
I
is “Bank
financing”, β is “Interest rate”, and
K′b
K∗
b
β is the “Loans supply elasticity”. The “Same as
2007” and “Increased participation” scenarios are those of Table 4.
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